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The Athlete as Public Figure in Light of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., or Torts
in Sports: The Role of the Courts
By RICHARD M. WISE*
I
Introduction
The tort of defamation, which consists of the "twin torts of
libel and slander,"1 has captured the fancy of the public for
years and has given rise to more litigation than perhaps any
other area of tort law.2 Most defamation claims involve "pri-
vate" party plaintiffs,3 and, until recently, the instances of a
truly famous plaintiff suing to protect the relational interests in
his or her name and reputation4 have been rather infrequent.'
Although there have been cases involving actors,6 entertain-
ers,7 prize fighters8 and baseball players,9 there has been no
* B.A., Mathematics, University of Rochester, 1977; M.B.A., University of Roches-
ter, 1978; C.P.A., Missouri, 1979; J.D., Washington University, 1983; Member, State Bar
of Missouri; Associate in the Tax Department of Brown, Smith, Wallace, Librach, Selt-
zer and Gordon.
This article is dedicated to the memory of my beloved uncle, William M. Pomerantz,
a skilled and dedicated attorney. The author also wishes to acknowledge the generous
assistance of Mary Schelling, without whose help this article would still be on the
drawing board.
1. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 25-32.
2. F. POLLOCK, LAw OF TORTS 243 (13th ed. 1929).
3. A "private" party plaintiff is one who is not a public figure. For the definition of
public figure, see infra note 16.
4. The interest protected by the law of defamation is a "relational" one in that it
involves the opinion which others in the community have of the plaintiff. W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 111.
5. Only since the cases of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), has the United States Supreme Court
defined the boundaries of the public figure doctrine. Before 1964, parties were proba-
bly more inclined to settle out of court rather than risk the mounting uncertainties of
trial.
6. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, Inc., v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.
Old. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
7. See, e.g., Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 A.D. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (1914).
8. See, e.g., Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1950). This invasion
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systematic treatment of the athlete as a public figure since the
United States Supreme Court handed down the public figure
doctrine in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 10 Because they are so
frequently in the public eye," plaintiff athletes have generally
been classified as public figures. 2 The courts have given little
or no weight to factors such as the length of time the athlete
has been in the public eye, 13 or the audience which has fol-
lowed his progress. 4
This article presents a brief history of the law of defamation,
discussing and analyzing the elements of, and defenses to,
common law claims of libel and slander. 5 It analyzes the pub-
lic figure doctrine, which governs defamation suits brought by
celebrity plaintiffs,' 6 particularly athletes, sets forth the bur-
den of proof required of a public figure for an actionable claim,
and presents the available remedies. It then proposes ways in
which the doctrines developed by the courts can be expanded
to define who the audience" of the defamatory communication
is and how long public figure status endures. 8 The article then
addresses the impact of these factors on the question of dam-
ages.'9 Finally, the analysis developed herein is applied to a
recent case.2 °
It is hoped that the focus given to the public figure doctrine
will assist both prospective plaintiffs and defendants in ascer-
taining their respective rights and duties in a defamation suit
and will aid in avoiding suits altogether.
of privacy case has also been applied in defamation cases. See infra notes 138, 141-42
and accompanying text.
9. See Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine and Broadcasting, 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968).
See also infra note 225.
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also infra text accompanying notes 53-73.
11. Cepeda, 392 F.2d at 419.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 307-29.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 254-306.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 25-41.
16. A public figure is defined as a person who has "assumed [a role] of especial
prominence in the affairs of society." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157,
164 (1979) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). This article focuses on the implications of the
two-part definition of public figure given by Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 254-306.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 307-29.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 254-329.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 330-41.
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II
Defamation
A. Brief History
The law of defamation developed out of the perceived neces-
sity of protecting a person's reputation in the community.21 In
recent times, the courts have felt obliged to find a balance be-
tween that interest and the public's interest in freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. 22 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court ultimately held that the balance of these competing in-
terests was to be measured by requiring a showing of "actual
malice," as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,23 in or-
der for a public official to set forth an actionable defamation
when suing to vindicate his reputation in the community.
Later cases have imposed the same "actual malice" require-
ment on law suits brought by public figures.24
Before one can properly grasp the public figure doctrine and
the current state of the law of defamation, it is essential to un-
derstand the common law elements of, and defenses to, actions
for defamation.
A defamatory communication is one which "tends so to harm
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associating...
with him."2 In addition, a communication may be defamatory
if it discredits or debases a person's name and good standing in
the community or tends to hold him up to public ridicule, ha-
tred or contempt.2 6 A defamation is called "libel" if made in
written or other permanent form and "slander" if made orally
or in another nonpermanent form. In each case, there must
be a "publication"-a communication to a third party.28
A libel may be categorized as libel per se, which results from
a communication which is defamatory on its face, or libel per
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111.
22. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964).
23. Id. at 279-80.
24. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) (decided together). See also infra note 44.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). See also Chuy v. Philadelphia
Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1281 (3d Cir. 1979).
26. Smith v. Huntington Pub. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1975).
See also Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1282.
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112.
28. Id. § 113.
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quod, which results from a communication which is defama-
tory only by innuendo or because of the special circumstances
in which it is made.29 Libel per se does not require proof of
special (monetary) damages, whereas libel per quod does re-
quire such proof."
Slander, as opposed to libel, has certain established catego-
ries of a per se defamation. The common law recognizes such a
facially apparent defamation in four contexts: (1) imputation
of a crime; (2) imputation of a loathsome disease; (3) words
affecting the plaintiff's trade or business; and (4) imputation of
sexual misconduct.3 1 Further, slander may also result from a
remark made defamatory by the setting, context or circum-
stances. Like libel per quod, it requires proof of special dam-
ages.3 Slander per se does not require such proof.33
Defenses to a defamation suit are many and varied. Some
defenses, such as truth,34 consent,35 and judicial privilege,36 are
complete, avoiding all liability of the defendant to the plain-
tiff.37 Others, such as interest of publisher, 38 interest of
others,39 and common interest,40 are qualified and only serve to
reduce the amount of damages.4 1 Complete defenses based
upon constitutional rights providing freedom of speech and of
the press42 will be the focus of this article, and therefore the
other defenses will not be addressed.
B. The Development of the Public Figure Doctrine
The seminal case in the current law of defamation is New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan .13 This case developed the stan-
dard of proof required of a public official in order to make out a
prima facie case of defamation. The standard was later ex-
29. Id. § 112.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, §§ 569-570.
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 112.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 116.
35. Id. § 114.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 115.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 114.
42. Id. § 118. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);see infra
text accompanying notes 43-52.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tended to public figures in general," but the term public figure
was not defined until the Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 45
In New York Times,46 Sullivan, the elected Police and Fire
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, sued the New York
Times for publishing a full-page advertisement charging the
existence of "an unprecedented wave of terror" against blacks
engaged in non-violent demonstrations in the South. Several
inaccuracies appeared in the ad. For example, the ad stated
that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had been arrested seven times,
rather than four. Sullivan alleged that his conduct as a public
official had been impugned, since the police misconduct would
be imputed to him as Police Commissioner.47  The United
States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court,
which had held the publication libelous per se as injuring
plaintiff's profession or trade.48 The United States Supreme
Court announced its holding, stating:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
44. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) (decided together). In Butts, the University of Georgia football coach sued over
an article claiming that he had "fixed" a football game. Walker arose out of an AP
report charging a retired general with leading a violent crowd in opposition to the en-
forcement of a desegregation decree at the University of Mississippi. In extending the
New York Times rule from public officials to public figures, one member of the Court
stated that "differentiation between [the two] and adoption of separate standards of
proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy." 388 U.S. at 163
(Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). In Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion,
he noted further:
(Ilt is plain that although they are not subject to the restraints of the political
process, 'public figures', like 'public officials,' often play an influential role in
ordering society. And surely as a class these 'public figures' have as ready
access as 'public officials' to mass media . . . both to influence policy and to
counter criticism of their views and activities. Our citizenry has a legitimate
and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the
press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues
and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials'.
388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). The Court's focus was again on
the competing interests at stake: the individual's interest in reputation and the pub-
lic's interest in the first amendment's freedom of the press. The Court failed, however,
to define the term public figure, or the means of classifying one. These matters
awaited decision until Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See infra text
accompanying notes 53-76.
45. 418 U.S. at 323.
46. 376 U.S. at 254.
47. Id. at 258.
48. Such a statement would be cause for an action of slander per se. See supra
text accompanying note 31.
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defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.4
9
The Court attempted to balance the interests in freedom of the
press against the individual's interest in his reputation.5"
The New York Times rule, as it has come to be known, was
extended from public officials to public figures in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.5 In so ex-
tending the rule, the Court stated that a public figure "who is
not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to repu-
tation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of inves-
tigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers."52
Exactly what made a person a public figure for the purposes
of the New York Times test was addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Gertz. 3 This case stands today as the
best illustration of the current state of the law of defamation,
for it not only defined public figure but also gave a two-pronged
basis of analysis by which to determine public figure status in
a particular case. The Gertz case is also important for its non-
public figure holdings, relating to whether, and when, a state
may allow the use of the New York Times standard of actual
malice in a case involving a private plaintiff and what harm
must be shown by the latter where actual malice is absent.
In Gertz, attorney Gertz sued for libel, alleging that defend-
ant publisher printed an article calling him a "Leninist," a
member of certain controversial organizations, and intimating
that he was guilty of criminal conduct.54 The plaintiff had long
been active in the community's affairs and had belonged to lo-
cal civic organizations as well as professional ones. Moreover,
he had published books and articles concerning legal subjects.
The issues were posed and addressed squarely for the first
time by the Supreme Court: Was plaintiff a public figure be-
49. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
50. Id. at 269-73.
51. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See supra note 44.
52. Id. at 155.
53. 418 U.S. at 323.
54. Id. at 326. This insinuation of the plaintiff's conduct as criminal would be ac-
tionable as slander per se. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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cause of his local, albeit limited (perhaps to legal and scholarly
circles) notoriety, despite the fact that none of the jurors had
heard of him prior to the instant litigation?5 Was plaintiff's
civic work, combined with the notoriety achieved through in-
volvement as counsel in an earlier, highly-publicized case,
enough to label plaintiff a public figure?56 If Gertz could be so
labelled, upon what bases in law would such a classification
rest?5 7
In finding that Gertz was not a public figure within the mean-
ing of the New York Times 8 and Curtis-Walker5 9 cases, the
Court set out the analysis to be used in determining public fig-
ure status, as well as the reasons for the need of such a classifi-
cation.6" The Court first addressed the rationale for the public
figure classification in defamation cases. Since "[t]he first
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help--using avail-
able opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error
. . ._,,61 and "public figures ... enjoy ... greater access to the
channels of effective communication ... than private individu-.
als normally enjoy. ,,62 public figures are less vulnerable to
injury and the state interest in protecting them is accordingly
less.6
3
The Court found a second and more important reason for the
public figure doctrine in the normative distinction between
public and private defamation plaintiffs. The individual who
runs for government office or involves himself in a public con-
troversy chooses to place himself before the public eye, at least
to a certain extent, and must therefore accept the "necessary
consequences of that involvement in public affairs."64 Thus,
whether a person has "assumed [a role] of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society" or "thrust [himself] to the fore-
front of [a] particular public controvers [y] in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved," her "invite[s]
attention and comment. '65 The Court then presented its two-
55. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 376 U.S. at 254.
59. 388 U.S. at 130.
60. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44, 351-52.
61. Id. at 344.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
No. 21
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pronged public figure classification:
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public figure
raises a different question. That designation may rest on either
of two alternative bases. In some instances an individual may
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a
public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More com-
monly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into
a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons
assume special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions .... Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety
in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society, an individual should not be deemed a public personal-
ity for all aspects of his life.66
Thus, the Court divided public figures into the "general" and
"limited" categories.67
The Gertz approach is referred to repeatedly in subsequent
case law. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,68 the
court noted that "in [Gertz],. . . the Supreme Court described
two types of public figures. Some individuals of 'pervasive
fame or notoriety' are public figures in all contexts. . . .Alter-
natively, 'an individual injects himself or is drawn into a public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues.' "69 This two-tiered classification of "general"
and "limited" public figures was likewise used in Rebozo v.
Washington Post Co.,70 where the court referred to the Gertz
case by stating that "under the analysis suggested in [Gertz],
two types of public figures emerge: Those who are public
figures for all purposes, and those who are public figures for a
limited range of issues."'' Finally, the Supreme Court itself re-
ferred to the Gertz two-tiered approach in Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 72 where it cited the language quoted above in
Chuy, and concluded that "[wI e identified two ways in which a
person may become a public figure for purposes of the First
Amendment. .. .
66. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
67. The terms general public figure and limited public figure will be used to desig-
nate the individual so defined.
68. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
69. Id. at 1280 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52).
70. 637 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 378.
72. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
73. Id. at 164.
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The Gertz case also presented significant non-public figure
holdings. It is not clear whether the holdings in Gertz are lim-
ited to media defendants. However, subsequent case law has
extended the application of Gertz to non-media as well as me-
dia defendants.74 The Gertz Court held that:
(i) with respect to persons who are not public figures, states
may define their own standards of liability, so long as it
is not liability without fault;
(ii) absent proof of actual malice, a private person may re-
cover only for "actual injury" to reputation, not limited to
monetary loss; and
74. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aftd, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979), the trial court held that "comment about public
figures should be equally protected whether made in mass media or in private." 431 F.
Supp. at 265 n.20 (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1975)). The first amendment requires such a rule, for if the press were given
more protection than private speech, persons would be encouraged to rush forth alle-
gations into wide publication rather than to present them carefully to informed parties
for verification in a private setting.
The district court also noted that the media's purpose is to inform private persons
(the public):
In terms of the First Amendment policies underlying Times and the hallowed
role of private dialogue in our society, it seems inappropriate to us to distin-
guish media from non-media speech and to elevate the media's role in aiding
the public in its discussion above private discussions occurring in everyday
life.
431 F. Supp. at 266 n.20 (emphasis added). Therefore, it would make no difference
whether the communication is made by a media or non-media defendant, where the
plaintiff is a public figure, because the New York Times standard of actual malice ap-
plies in either case.
The district court held that "[w]here a person has.., chosen [court's emphasis] to
engage in a profession which draws him regularly into regional and national view and
leads to 'fame and notoriety in the community,' even if he has no ideological thesis to
promulgate, he invites general public discussion." The court noted further that, as
shown by "the Nielson ratings, the American public is fascinated by professional
sports. In view of that fact we must affirm the proposition that interest in professional
football must be deemed an important incident among many incidents, of a society
founded upon a high regard for free expression." 431 F. Supp. at 267 (emphasis ad-
ded). The court went on to hold:
We consider it unacceptable for a court in determining whether a particular
individual is a 'public figure' to pass qualitatively upon the 'affairs of society.'
If society chooses to direct massive public attention to a particular sphere of
activity, those who enter that sphere inviting such attention must overcome the
Times standard.
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the court below emphasized that the plaintiff's en-
trance into a profession of high visibility is the element necessary to hold him a public
figure, apparently for all purposes. But the court of appeals considered plaintiff a pub-
lic figure among sports fans. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280. This seems to be the appropriate
audience, for not everyone is a football fan. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06
and 254-306 for a discussion of the position entered by the plaintiff and the audience as
factors in determining public figure status.
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(iii) to determine whether or not a plaintiff is a public figure,
courts must look either to the plaintiff's general notoriety
or to his participation in the particular controversy in-
volved. The test is whether or not he has involved him-
self in a public issue or attempted to influence its
resolution.75
The Gertz public figure doctrine is critical in determining the
quantum of proof needed by the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of defamation. If a person is a public figure, he must
prove that the publication was made with actual malice, ac-
cording to the New York Times rule. If, however, he is a private
person, a cause of action may. lie for mere negligence in failing
to ascertain the truth or falsity of the publication, depending
upon state law.76
Further refinements in the public figure doctrine were made
in several respects in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications,
Inc.,7 a case involving a businessman. The Waldbaum court
refined the Gertz general-limited public figure dichotomy, giv-
ing specific tests on which to base the plaintiff's status, and ad-
dressed the issue of audience impact on damages.78 The
plaintiff, former president and chief executive officer of a large
consumer cooperative, sued for libel based on an article alleg-
edly demeaning his abilities as a businessman. While serving
as the president and head of Greenbelt Consumer Services,
Inc., Waldbaum played an active role in the setting of policies
and standards within the supermarket industry. He frequently
held meetings, open to the press and public, on topics such as
energy legislation and fuel allocation, as well as supermarket
practices. Further, Waldbaum followed a strong policy of elim-
inating unprofitable outlets. All these actions resulted in sub-
stantial comment regarding both plaintiff Waldbaum and
Greenbelt in trade journals and general-interest publications.79
When Greenbelt's board of directors dismissed Waldbaum,
the defendant published an article describing the termination,
stating that the co-op "ha [d] been losing money the past year
75. 418 U.S. at 347-52.
76. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, at § 580B. Many states have adopted a negligence
standard for private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223,
531 P.2d 76 (1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976);
Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
77. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
78. Id. at 1295-1300.
79. Id. at 1290.
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and retrenching. Waldbaum had served as president since
1971."'80 Waldbaum filed suit for libel, alleging that Greenbelt
had not in fact been losing money or retrenching, and that this
article damaged his reputation as a businessman.8 '
The trial court entered summary judgment for the defend-
ant, concluding that the plaintiff was a public figure for the is-
sues related to Greenbelt's "position within the supermarket
industry and Waldbaum's efforts to advance that position."82
The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Waldbaum had
indeed entered a position of influence and used such influence
to "advocate and practice controversial policies that substan-
tially affect led] others,"83 becoming a public figure for that de-
bate, and that the defendant's article commented on a range of
issues protected under the New York Times standard.84 Since
Waldbaum admittedly could not prove actual malice, he could
not make out a prima facie case of libel.8 5
The court in Waldbaum concluded that the general-limited
dichotomy of Gertz meant that "a person can be a general pub-
lic figure only if he is a 'celebrity'-his name a 'household
word'-whose ideas and actions the public in fact follows with
great interest."8 6 On the other hand, the court concluded that
"a person has become a public figure for limited purposes if he
is attempting to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a
major impact on the resolution of a specific public dispute that
has foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons be-
yond its immediate participants."8 The court must make this
examination by looking through "the eyes of a reasonable per-
son at the facts taken as a whole."88 Some factors suggested by
the court as useful in determining general public figure status
include: statistical surveys of name recognition, previous
press coverage, the plaintiff's effect in causing others to alter
their conduct or ideas by his actions, and the plaintiff's actions
toward shunning media attention and the relative success or
80. Id. at 1290 n.5.
81. Id. at 1290.
82. Id. at 1291.
83. Id. at 1300.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1290.
86. Id. at 1292.
87. Id.
88. Id.
No. 21
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failure of such actions.89 The judge must bear in mind at all
times the "voluntariness of the plaintiff's prominence and the
availability of self-help through press coverage of responses
.... ,90 No one factor is dispositive and the judgment calls for
a careful weighing of these and other relevant factors.9'
In examining a limited public figure, a court must first isolate
the public controversy.92 It must be a genuine dispute, not sim-
ply a private concern, that affects the general public or some
part of it in an appreciable way.93 To determine the existence
and contours of a public controversy, the court must determine
if persons are actually discussing a specific question.94 Indeed,
the Waldbaum court defined a public controversy as a matter
"being debated publicly [with] foreseeable and substantial
ramifications for nonparticipants." 9
After isolating the public controversy, the court must ana-
lyze the plaintiff's role in it.96 The Gertz Court held that pe-
ripheral participation is not enough to warrant the New York
Times protection of actual malice.97 Indeed, the Court stated
that individuals must have "thrust themselves to the forefront"
of the controversies in order to become factors in their ulti-
mate resolution,98 achieving "special prominence" in the de-
bate.99 The plaintiff must either have been purposely
attempting "to influence the outcome or could realistically
have been expected, because of his position in the controversy,
to have an impact on its resolution."'10 A court may look to the
plaintiff's past conduct, name recognition surveys and the like
for this determination. 10 1
The Waldbaum court concluded that the final step in deter-
mining whether or not the New York Times standard applies to
a limited public figure is to ascertain whether the alleged defa-
mation was "germane to the plaintiff's participation in the con-
89. Id. at 1295.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1296.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1297.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
98. Id. at 345.
99. Id. at 351.
100. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
101. Id. at 1295.
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troversy."'1 2 His personal characteristics, such as honesty,
courage or intelligence, could be relevant to the public's deci-
sion whether or not to listen to him, but "[m]isstatements
wholly unrelated to the controversy. . . do not receive the New
York Times protection."' 3
The Waldbaum court noted that "[s]ometimes position
alone can make one a public figure."'0 4 The position itself may
be so notable that "any occupant unavoidably enters the lime-
light and thus becomes generally known in the community-a
general public figure. Similarly, the responsibilities of a posi-
tion may include decisionmaking that affects significantly one
or more public controversies, in which case the occupant be-
comes a limited public figure for those controversies."' '° Thus,
the Waldbaum court gave one possible means of classifying
public figures into the general or limited category-by posi-
tion-a method which prior case law had not advanced.'
0 6
Finally, the Waldbaum court stated its belief that the
Supreme Court in Gertz used the phrase "general fame or no-
toriety" to mean "being known to a large percentage of the
well-informed citizenry," not that a "majority" of the public
must know of the plaintiff.107 The issue of precisely which
"well-informed citizenry" is relevant was also addressed by the
Waldbaum court. The court concluded that nationwide fame
is not required for general public figure status, but rather "the
question is whether the individual had achieved the necessary
degree of notoriety where he was defamed-that is, where the
defamation was published." 108 The court thereby advanced the
theory that defining the audience of the alleged defamation is
critical not only in determining general versus limited public
figure status, but also in assessing damages for an actionable
102. Id. at 1298.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1299 n.36 (citing Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp.
254, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979), and Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
105. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1299-1300 n.36.
106. Although the Waldbaum court cited the Chuy and Curtis cases for the proposi-
tion that position may be a guide in determining public figure status, those cases did
not include such a statement in their holdings, but only in broad dicta. See, e.g., Chuy,
595 F.2d at 1280. Waldbaum, on the other hand, seemed to include this use of position
in its analysis of the plaintiff's status with Greenbelt, and intimated that such use
would be consistent with New York Times and Gertz. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1299-
1300.
107. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n.20.
108. Id. at 1296 n.22 (emphasis added).
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defamation. °9 Indeed, the court went on to state that "the def-
amation's audience may be relevant in assessing damages, for
injury may be less if the audience does not know of the victim
and will have no occasion to interact with him in the future."' 10
The Waldbaum case is therefore an important step forward
from the Gertz decision in several respects. It went beyond the
"skeletal descriptions of public figures and private persons
enunciated in Gertz," '' advancing methods and factors for
classifying individual plaintiffs as general or limited public
figures. The case advanced the ideas of audience and position
as useful guides in the classification scheme as well as in mea-
suring damages, and set forth a useful definition of "public con-
troversy" for determining limited public figure status.
III
Case Law-The Defamed Athlete
A. Pre-Gertz
The pre-New York Times case of Martin v. Wagner" 2 illus-
trates some simple, yet important, principles of common law
defamation. The case represents a classic example of the dis-
tinction between libel per se, which is actionable without proof
of pecuniary loss," 3 and libel per quod, which is actionable
only upon proof of such loss." 4 It also foreshadowed the need
for the New York Times test of actual malice.
The plaintiff, Martha Martin, a stuntwoman, sued the Hearst
Newspaper Corporation, actress Natalie Wood, actor Robert
Wagner, Wood's husband, the William Morris Agency, and
others, for publishing an allegedly libelous statement by ac-
tress Wood that the plaintiff "couldn't swim."'" 5 Ms. Wood,
named as Mrs. Wagner in the suit, was interviewed by the New
York Mirror, and in response to the question of whether or not
she had a double, Wagner replied, "Sure, but she couldn't
swim. It seems they forgot to ask her. So I jumped in and did
the scene .... "6 The plaintiff further alleged that she was
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1292.
112. 30 Misc. 2d 1074, 220 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
114. Id.
115. Martin, 30 Misc. 2d at 1075, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
116. Id.
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an "expert swimmer," the only "double" employed for Wagner,
that she was hired to swim for Wagner, and that she in fact did
swim for her.117
The court denied recovery, holding that the statement was
not libelous per se because a statement that a double cannot
swim does not take away from her abilities as a double in other
ways, in so far as a double is only a "substitute.""' 8 Further,
innuendo would not make words libelous unless they were al-
ready libelous per se. 1" 9 Finally, the court held that the words
spoken and printed did not touch the plaintiff's trade or occu-
pation because the article did not speak of the plaintiff as an
expert swimmer or stunt player, but merely as a "double.' 2 °
The words could therefore not support a finding of libel per se
based on the category of words affecting one's trade or busi-
ness, and the plaintiff would have to prove specific monetary
loss to recover on her claim.' 2' Thus, the allegations that the
plaintiff was a stunt player and hired to do a risky scene were
extrinsic to the publication, and "[t] he mere statement that an
unnamed 'double' was not able to swim [was] not libelous on
its face.' 22 The plaintiff would have had to prove these extrin-
sic facts, as well as special damages to her reputation as a
double, to recover.'23
The court's holding that a per se libelous publication must
refer directly to the plaintiff's trade or business in order to jus-
tify recovery, but that plaintiff must prove special damage to
reputation if the statement is unconnected with his trade, is
sensible in view of the later New York Times holding. In cases
involving a media defendant, the balance between freedom of
the press and protection of an individual's interest in his repu-
tation can be achieved by only allowing the speech to extend to
a point that would not injure a plaintiff's means of earning a
living. 24
The plaintiff, Martin, could be considered an athlete because
117. Id. at 1076, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1077, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
121. Id. at 1077-78, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28. See also supra text accompanying notes
31-33.
122. Martin, 30 Misc. 2d at 1076, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
123. Id. at 1076-78, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28. See also supra text accompanying notes
29-33.
124. Martin, 30 Misc. 2d at 1077-78, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28.
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in her role as Wagner's double, and in her trade, the plaintiff
was known as an expert swimmer. 125 Moreover, as a
stuntwoman, she was called upon regularly to perform difficult
physical stunts.'26 There is considerable doubt, however,
whether plaintiff could be classified as a public figure, either
general or limited. She was certainly not a "household word"
and, therefore, could not be classified as a general public fig-
ure. 27 Moreover, the only audience before whom she was well-
known was the group of people closely involved in the movie
industry and, more specifically, in stunt work. 28 Further, the
only controversy into which plaintiff was drawn involved the
lawsuit itself, and an otherwise private person cannot be made
into a public figure by mere publicity surrounding the defama-
tion. 29 This principle prevents the media from converting an
individual into a public figure by publicity concerning the defa-
mation and efforts to create a public controversy out of it and
then attempting to invoke the protection of actual malice re-
quired by New York Times. 3 ° The plaintiff's status must,
therefore, be examined in light of circumstances existing
before the publication. 3' In Martin, therefore, plaintiff could
not have been considered a limited public figure. Determina-
tion of the public figure question was, of course, not necessary
for the court's holding, inasmuch as the statements were found
not to be defamatory on their face and plaintiff could not prove
the special damages required in a case of innuendo. Yet the
case does illustrate the differences between libel per se and
libel per quod, which existed both before and after New York
Times.
A case that arose after New York Times but before Gertz,
Time, Inc. v. Johnston,32 presents both a good set of facts for
analysis and the state of the common law of defamation before
Gertz. In Johnston, plaintiff Neil Johnston, a former profes-
sional basketball player, sued Time, Inc., for libel basing his
claim upon an article published in defendant's periodical,
125. Id. at 1076, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
126. See id. at 327.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
129. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 n.19 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).
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Sports Illustrated.'33 In the article, Coach Arnold "Red"
Auerbach of the Boston Celtics was quoted as stating that Bos-
ton's young Bill Russell "destroyed" Johnston "psychologically
... so that he practically ran him out of organized basket-
ball."'34 The event referred to had occurred twelve years
before the publication, and the publication was some nine
years after plaintiff's retirement from "organized professional
basketball."'35 At the time of the suit, plaintiff was the assis-
tant basketball coach at Wake Forest University.'36 The court
noted that plaintiff attained his position in large part through
his status as a well-known figure in the game. 37 The court re-
jected plaintiff's contention that he had shed his public figure
status by the time of the article's publication, and overruled
the district court on this point.'38 The lower court, relying on
133. Id. at 379.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 380.
136. Id. at 379.
137. The court of appeals noted:
By his claim for damages here, he is contending that his standing as a college
basketball coach rests substantially on the public recollection and estimation
of his former career as a professional basketball player; and it is for that rea-
son he sues. It is because he is still engaged in basketball and because of the
effect that any adverse comment on his record and achievements as a basket-
ball star may have on his present position in basketball that he claims damage
herein.
Id. at 381.
138. Id. at 381-82. The plaintiff Johnston may have asserted a cause of action based
on either invasion of privacy or trade disparagement (referred to at early common law
as "slander of title," more often today called "injurious falsehood.") The common law
right of privacy has been broken into four components, each representing the invasion
of a different interest: appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's
advantage; intrusion upon the seclusion of another; publication of material placing
plaintiff in a false light before the public eye; and public disclosure of private facts. W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117.
In the leading case concerning invasion of privacy, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975), in which the defendant published an account of the rape and mur-
der of plaintiffs daughter, the Supreme Court ruled for the defendant. The Court held:
It is true that in defamation actions, where the protected interest is personal
reputation, the prevailing view is that truth is a defense [footnote omitted];
and the message of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [citations omitted] and
like cases is that the defense of truth is constitutionally required where the
subject of the publication is a ... public figure. What is more, the defamed
. . . public figure must prove not only that the publication is false but that it
was knowingly so or was circulated with reckless disregard for its truth or fal-
sity. Similarly, where the interest at issue is privacy rather than reputation
and the right claimed is to be free from the publication of false or misleading
information about one's affairs, the target of the publication must prove know-
ing or reckless falsehood where the materials published, although, assertedly
342 COMM/ENT L. I. [Vol. 6
private, are 'matters of public interest.' Time, Inc. v. Hill, [385 U.S. 374], 387-88
[(1967)] (emphasis added).
420 U.S. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), wherein defendant published a story con-
cerning a play based on the plaintiff's family's experience in being held hostage by
three escaped convicts, plaintiff sued for an invasion of privacy under New York statu-
tory law. The Supreme Court held for the defendant, ruling that "the Constitutional
protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York [privacy]
statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disre-
gard of the truth." 385 U.S. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
In Hill, the Court applied the New York Times standard of actual malice to a privacy
case. Combining the reasoning and standards set out in Hill and Cox, it is clear that,
in privacy cases, a standard of actual malice is used to protect publishers of "matters of
public interest." In a case in which the athlete deems himself sufficiently injured to
assert a cause of action for defamation, the publication invariably involves a "matter of
public interest." This is so because the public figure is defined as a person who "ha[s]
assumed [a] role of especial prominence in the affairs of society." Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345. Therefore, if a public figure cannot prove his case in defamation, he cannot win it
under the law of privacy because the actual malice standard of New York Times pro-
tects the publisher in either case. It is important to note that the distinction between a
private publication by an individual and a publication by the media is irrelevant in this
regard. See supra note 74.
The elements of a cause of action for trade disparagement are:
(1) a false statement; (2) published to a third party; (3) derogatory to the
plaintiff's title to his property or its quality, or to his business in general or to
some element of his personal affairs; (4) through which the defendant in-
tended to cause harm to the plaintiff's pecuniary interest or either recognized
or should have recognized that it was likely to do so; (5) which the defendant
published with malice; and (6) special damages to the plaintiff resulting from
the statement.
Williams v. Burns, 540 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (D. Colo. 1982) (citing RESTATEMENT, supra
note 25, at §§ 623A, 624). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 129 at 919-20; System
Operations v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1977).
Accordingly, not only must the trade disparagement plaintiff prove defendant's
knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the publication (actual malice), he
must also prove special damages in all cases. System Operations, 555 F.2d at 1140. A
defamation plaintiff need only prove special damages in certain cases. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-33. A defamation plaintiff need not prove falsity of the state-
ment, rather the defendant must assert truth as an affirmative defense. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 25, § 583. In trade disparagement cases, the plaintiff must prove falsity.
Williams, 540 F. Supp. at 1243; System Operations, 555 F.2d at 1131. Therefore, a public
figure athlete losing in a defamation action cannot win in a trade disparagement case
because the burden of proving actual malice must still be carried. In addition, the
requirement that he prove falsity and special damages makes it exceedingly unlikely
that he could win in such an action if the defamation count is lost.
In a trade disparagement case, a plaintiff may win a preliminary injunction. The test
is whether the moving party can show a reasonable probability of success on the mer-
its, and irreparable harm if the motion is not granted; the trial court should consider,
when appropriate, the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or
denial of the injunction, and the public interest. Systems Operations, 555 F.2d at 1141
(citing Oburn v. Shapp., 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975)).
In contrast to injurious falsehood, an injunction will not issue in a defamation case.
See Krebiozen Research Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d 1 (1956),
TORTS IN SPORTS
the pre-Gertz case of Rosenblatt v. Baer,'39 had stated that
plaintiff was "so far removed from his former position in the
public eye, that the publisher will no longer enjoy the prophy-
lactic treatment accorded him when he deals with those per-
sons who truly are public officials or public figures." 14 0
The court of appeals, likening defamation to privacy, held
that:
[w] hen plaintiff sought publicity and the adulation of the pub-
lic, he relinquished his right to privacy on matters pertaining to
his professional activity, and he could not at his will and whim
draw himself ... into his shell and hold others liable for com-
menting upon the acts which had taken place when he had vol-
untarily exposed himself to the public eye ....141
Although the court of appeals held that the passage of time did
not remove the plaintiff's public figure status, it did leave room
for the future application of such a principle."4 The court's dif-
ficulty with the lower court's ruling on this point was simply
that plaintiff had "remained in organized professional basket-
ball, until ...approximately two years [before] the publica-
tion," albeit the last eight years as a coach, not as a player.143
Therefore, the court reasoned, "[t]his . .. [was] not such a
case as was envisaged by Justice Brennan" in Rosenblatt v.
Baer.'" Accordingly, the court left open the possibility that
passage of time will, in some circumstances, cause a plaintiff to
lose public figure status. 45
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956); Kuhn v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 29 F. Supp. 800
(S.D.N.Y. 1939). In fact, the Supreme Court has struck down statutes authorizing in-
junctive relief against defamatory publications as an unconstitutional denial of free-
dom of the press. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
139. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). In Rosenblatt, Mr. Justice Brennan remarked: "To be sure,
there may be cases where a person is so far removed from a former position of author-
ity that comment on the manner in which he performed his responsibilities no longer
has the interest necessary to justify the New York Times rule." 383 U.S. at 87 n.14. This
appears to leave open the possibility of a limited public figure becoming, once again, a
private citizen with the passage of time. See infra text accompanying notes 307-29.
140. Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 321 F. Supp. 837, 851 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
141. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App.
2d 704, 705, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (1949)).
142. Although the court of appeals held that Johnston was still a public figure, it
qualified this holding by noting that "he could not at his will and whim withdraw him-
self ... into his shell ...." Johnston, 448 F.2d at 382 (emphasis added). The court
thus left room for events beyond the plaintiffs control, such as passage of time, to
remove public figure status from plaintiffs whose public status has been built over
time. See infra note 145 and text accompanying notes 307-29.
143. Johnston, 448 F.2d at 381.
144. Id. (citing Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87, n.14).
145. In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 157 (1979), plaintiff sued for libel
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Another important aspect of Johnston is that the case was
decided in the context of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,146
wherein the Supreme Court extended New York Times protec-
tion with respect to all "matter[s] of legitimate public inter-
est."'47 The Johnston court used the Rosenbloom rationale as
another basis, apart from plaintiffs public figure status, for ex-
tending New York Times protection to defendant Time, Inc., in
that the defendant's article at issue was a "matter of legitimate
public interest."'48 The Rosenbloom rationale was repudiated,
however, by the Supreme Court in Gertz, where the Court con-
cluded that "[the extension of the New York Times test pro-
posed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [the state's
interest in enforcing a legal remedy for defamation cases in-
volving a private individual] to a degree that we find unaccept-
able."' 4 9 Accordingly, though Johnston may have been
properly decided and is a good illustration of pre-Gertz law, it
might be decided differently in light of both Gertz'o and Time,
Inc. v. Firestone. 5
B. Post-Gertz
The most important case brought by an athlete since Gertz is
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club .152 The case illus-
trates the application of the public figure doctrine, as well as
the question of the relevant audience of the publication and
the distinction between libel per se and libel per quod.
The Chuy case arose out of comments made by the defend-
ant's team physician, Dr. Nixon, and by the team's general
manager to the press concerning plaintiffs physical condition
allegedly committed by defendant who published statements in a book which stated
that the plaintiff was "[almong Soviet agents identified in the United States" and "con-
victed of ... contempt charges following espionage indictments." The book's index
listed plaintiff as a "Soviet agent in U.S." Plaintiff had pleaded guilty to contempt of
court for failure to testify at the trial of his aunt and uncle for espionage. The Court
specifically reserved the issue of the effect of time passage on public figure status,
where it stated that "we need not and do not decide whether or when an individual
who was once a public figure may lose that status by the passage of time." 443 U.S. at
166 n.7.
146. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
147. Id. at 79.
148. Johnston, 448 F.2d at 381-82 (citing Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 29).
149. 418 U.S. at 346. The public interest exception to New York Times was also repu-
diated in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
150. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
151. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
152. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
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following a routine physical examination. Plaintiff Don Chuy
sued his former employer, the Philadelphia Eagles of the Na-
tional Football League (NFL) for breach of contract, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. Chuy
sued for damages following the publication of a newspaper ar-
ticle describing the team doctor's diagnosis of his illness and
his prognosis for the future. The physician stated that Chuy
was seriously ill and would be forced to retire from profes-
sional football. 153 After reading the article, published nation-
ally, Chuy allegedly panicked, called his personal physician
and learned that the disease could be fatal. Chuy alleged he
suffered emotional distress and marital problems, even after it
was found that he did not have the disease reported. 54 The
lower court entered judgment for Chuy for two years' pay on
his contract, $10,000 for emotional distress, and punitive dam-
ages of $60,000, but denied damages for defamation. 5 The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment in all respects. 56
The lower court posed special interrogatories to the jury on
the issues of whether the statements made were capable of de-
famatory meaning, whether the defendant's team physician in-
tentionally communicated them to the reporter and whether
the reporter understood that publication of the statements
would tend to injure plaintiff's reputation.'5 7 The jury re-
sponded affirmatively to the first two questions, but negatively
to the last. Because Pennsylvania law required that the recipi-
ent of the communication be aware of its defamatory nature
for a plaintiff to prevail, 58 the court was compelled to enter a
verdict for the defendant on the defamation count. 59
On appeal, however, the court concluded, as a matter of law,
that the remarks in question were not capable of defamatory
meaning and, therefore, that the issue should not have been
submitted to the jury.60 It therefore affirmed the denial of
damages for defamation.
In deciding the issue of whether the physician's remarks
153. Id. at 1269-70.
154. Id. at 1270.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1282.
157. Id. at 1279-80.
158. Id. at 1280 (citing Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (Pa.
1971), and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1584a(d)).
159. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280.
160. Id.
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were capable of defamatory meaning, the Court of Appeals be-
gan by applying the public figure doctrine. The New York
Times standard, requiring a public figure plaintiff to prove pub-
lication with actual malice, also requires such a figure to prove
by convincing clarity that the statements are capable of defam-
atory meaning.161 Since this stricter standard of proof is re-
quired of public figures, the initial inquiry must be whether or
not the plaintiff is a public figure. Within that inquiry, it is use-
ful, although not necessary, to determine on which of the two
Gertz classifications, general or limited public figure, plaintiff's
status rests.'62
Plaintiff Chuy had been a starting player for the Eagles and
had received widespread media attention when involved in a
major trade from the Los Angeles Rams.' 63 The injury that ul-
timately led to discovery of a physical condition which forced
his retirement from professional football occurred on the play-
ing field before thousands of interested members of the pub-
lic.'64 More important, the court reasoned that "[p]rofessional
athletes, at least as to their playing careers, generally assume a
position of public prominence. Their contractual disputes, as
well as their athletic accomplishments, command the attention
of sports fans."'65 The court held Chuy to be a public figure as
a matter of law, "at least with respect to his ability to play foot-
ball," because the injury and the attention surrounding its
treatment resulted from plaintiff's football-playing ability.'6 6
Plaintiff was therefore a public figure and had to prove that the
publication was made with actual malice, if, indeed, it was
defamatory. 67
The court thus found no difficulty in labelling plaintiff a pub-
lic figure, yet its reasoning is not entirely clear. The problems
are two-fold. First, the court did not say which part of the two-
prong Gertz test applied.' 68 Second, it seemed to limit Chuy's
161. New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
163. 595 F.2d at 1280.
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added). These statements by the court imply that the court may
have found that the passage of time would remove Chuy's public figure status. The
fame of his athletic feats or the notoriety of his contract controversies may fade from
public memory. See supra note 145 and infra text accompanying notes 307-29.
166. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 107-10 and infra text accompanying notes
254-306.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
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public figure status to the context of his athletic accomplish-
ments and to the audience of sports fans. 169
Having classified plaintiff as a public figure, the court then
proceeded to the issue of whether or not the statements made
were capable of defamatory meaning. 7 ' The court applied the
Restatement (First) of Torts' definition of "defamatory": "A
communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputa-
tion of another as to lower him in the estimation of the commu-
nity or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."'' Keeping in mind that the imputation of a loathsome
disease is slander per se 172 and that libel per se results from a
facially defamatory written or other permanent publication, 173
the remarks made by the team physician to the reporter can be
classified separately from the written article printed by the
newspaper. Since plaintiff Chuy did not sue the reporter or the
newspaper, the Philadelphia Bulletin, it is unnecessary to ad-
dress this distinction further.' 74
The liability for imputing to another the presence of a "loath-
some disease" has generally been limited to venereal disease
and leprosy, neither of which was involved here.' 7 Further,
the court noted that in today's society of advanced medical sci-
ence, health and disease are discussed freely and openly, "in
the home, in social circles, and in the media."' 76 It went on to
hold that "[t]he incurrence of a ... fatal illness is indeed un-
fortunate but, unless the disease is loathsome, it does not tar-
nish the victim's reputation or cause others to spurn him"
because "[pIersons afflicted with. . . serious diseases. . fre-
quently carry on their personal or professional activities in to-
day's enlightened world in normal fashion and without any
deprecatory reflection whatsoever.' '177
Although Chuy did not assert the per se libel cause of action
based on injury to his trade or business, the majority opinion
169. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280. The issues of how long and among what audience the
plaintiff may be deemed a public figure are dealt with below, as is the analysis of who
should be a public figure among athletic personalities. See infra text accompanying
notes 212-53 & 254-329.
170. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280.
171. Id. at 1281 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 559 (1938)).
172. See supra text accompanying note 31.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
174. See supra note 74.
175. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1281.
176. Id. at 1282.
177. Id.
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considered this and found it to be invalid.'78 Chuy testified
that he told the defendant's general manager in January, 1970,
that he would definitely not be back to play and that his doctor
advised him in February, 1970, to discontinue "serious strenu-
ous physical activity."'179 His testimony precluded recovery on
his defamation claim because the reporter's article was not
published until April 9, 1970. Comment c to section 573 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
The imputation must be of such a character as to [harm] the
other in the pursuit of his business, trade, profession or office
or tend to harm him in it. Therefore an imputation of miscon-
duct of a public officer whose term has expired does not come
within the rule stated in this Section. 180
Since Chuy's carrer was already over, he could not have been
damaged by the publication. Similarly, the argument that
Chuy was set back in his attempts to become a professional
sportscaster had no basis because there was no evidence that
he had any such interest. The conclusion of the majority was,
therefore, that the words published were not capable of defam-
atory meaning.'"'
The majority and the dissenting judge differed on the ques-
tion of whether the words published were capable of a defama-
tory meaning. The dissent believed the majority erred in
upholding the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new
trial on the defamation count because the evidence did not
support that count as a matter of law.182 The dissent focused
on the possibility, considered by the majority, that plaintiff
Chuy may have wished to pursue a career in sportscasting, ad-
vertising, or perhaps a sport less strenuous than football.183
While the majority dismissed this theory out of hand because
it had not been raised by plaintiff on appeal and because the
evidence indicated no ambition by plaintiff to pursue such en-
deavors,'84 the dissent felt it necessary to give the proposition
further consideration. 185
178. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 25,
§ 568. The court stated that although it was not clear whether plaintiff raised this issue
on appeal, it was not a valid cause of action. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1282.
179. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1282.
180. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 573, comment c.
181. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1282.
182. Id. at 1285 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1282.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1285 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
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Bearing in mind both that the majority concluded that the
team physician's statements were not "capable of defamatory
meaning," '186 and that the Restatement's definition of "defama-
tory" requires only that the communication "tends ... to harm
the reputation,"'187 the dissent concluded that the majority had
given short shrift to plaintiff's defamation claim.'88 The publi-
cation that a potentially fatal illness caused Chuy's early re-
tirement from professional football might well have deterred a
potential employer from associating or dealing with him. In-
deed, the dissent stated succinctly that "[w]here the imputa-
tion of a fatal physical disease is explicitly related in the
allegedly defamatory communication to a person's profes-
sional demise, his business stature has been seriously weak-
ened."'89 If such a communication were to deter others from
associating or dealing with Chuy, then certainly the words
were capable of defamatory meaning, and the majority would
have incorrectly decided this point. The dissent so concluded
when it stated that, in the context of foregone business oppor-
tunities resulting from the publication, "Dr. Nixon's imputa-
tion to [Chuy] of a potentially fatal illness might have been
understood as conveying a defamatory meaning."190
The dissent also determined who constituted the relevant
audience of the allegedly defamatory communication. It be-
lieved that "[dlefamatory words spoken to a newspaper re-
porter for attribution in a column should be deemed
communicated not alone to the reporter but also to the general
readership of the newspaper."'' Therefore, "[tihe jury...
should have been asked whether the average reader of the
Philadelphia Bulletin understood Dr. Nixon's statements as
harming Chuy's reputation."'192
The evidence in the record clearly supported these conclu-
sions. At the trial, the jury found both that the team physician
intentionally told the reporter of Chuy's illness and that the
resulting article was defamatory.'9 3 The problem, of course,
was that the jury was instructed that for Chuy to prevail it was
186. Id. at 1282 (emphasis added).
187. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 559 (emphasis added).
188. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1285 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1284-85.
190. Id. at 1285 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Sellers v. Time, Inc., 423 F.2d 887, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1970)).
193. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1279-80. See also supra text accompanying note 158.
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necessary that the reporter had understood the defamatory na-
ture of the statements.9 4 This appears contradictory at best,
and absurd at worst, for the jury's answers to the special inter-
rogatories manifestly showed that the reporter's understand-
ing of the physician's statements did not correspond to the
average reader's understanding. 195 Accordingly, since a story
concerning a public figure athlete, bearing on his professional
demise, must logically be assumed to be intended for wide-
spread publication when conveyed to a reporter for a large
metropolitan newspaper, 96 the average reader must be
deemed the relevant audience.
The dissent's approach and conclusion are better reasoned
than that of the majority. They are supported not only by com-
mon sense but by the "assumption of exposure" and "access to
media" policies behind the public figure doctrine. 97 That is, a
well-known person may enter the limelight voluntarily and as-
sume the risk of exposure, but it is risk of exposure to the pub-
lic, not to the intermediary between the speaker of the
defamatory remarks and the public, that the public figure as-
sumes. 98 Similarly, if one considered only this intermediary
as the audience and assumed there would be no further com-
munication of the defamatory remark, then one could not ex-
pect the public figure to gain access to the media to counteract
the remark. The media might not consider such access worthy
of its time and attention because of its assumption that the re-
mark would not have been republished beyond the intermedi-
ary and consequently little or no harm would have come to the
public figure's reputation.'99 Therefore, the approach set forth
in the dissent as to both the defamatory nature and the rele-
vant audience of the remark20 0 pursues both the course of com-
mon sense and the policies behind the public figure doctrine.
The Chuy case illustrates not only the application of the pub-
lic figure doctrine in the context of the athlete as plaintiff, but it
also presents the question of the relevant audience for a de-
famatory communication.
194. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1279-80.
195. Id. at 1285 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-45. See also supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
200. Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1283-86 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
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Despite the court's wavering in Chuy ,201 both Chuy and John-
ston 212 are useful in classifying athletic personalities as gen-
eral and limited public figures, affording a logical treatment for
both. Furthermore, they present distinct clues that the pas-
sage of time may remove the cloak of public figure status from
an athlete and thereby pluck from defendants the shield of the
New York Times first amendment privilege in certain classes
of cases.
Analyzing these two cases with the aid of Waldbaum 2 3 and
Rosenblatt, °4 it becomes simpler to separate the athlete into
distinct categories. The Johnston case classified the plaintiff as
a general public figure because of the fame and notoriety he
had achieved during his professional basketball career. °5 At
the same time, it implied that he might have been only a lim-
ited public figure had he not achieved star status with the Phil-
adelphia Warriors during his career.206 Therefore, as in other
cases, the athletic personality may be divided into limited and
general public figures. The limited case would apply to a per-
son who thrusts himself or is drawn into the forefront of a pub-
lic controversy 2°7 in an attempt to influence its outcome, 208 or
to one who occupies a position which, by its nature, involves
decision-making affecting public controversies. 20 9 The general
201. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
202. 448 F.2d 378.
203. 627 F.2d 1287.
204. 383 U.S. 75.
205. 448 F.2d at 381. See also supra text accompanying notes 132-51.
206. See Johnston, 448 F.2d at 381.
207. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52. See also supra text accompanying note 95 for the
definition of public controversy. As applied to athletic figures, this public controversy
aspect of the two-pronged Gertz test of public figure status is well illustrated by a case
involving a non-athelete. In Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981), plaintiff sued for
"false light" invasion of privacy and defamation from defendant's portrayal of her in a
so-called "docu-drama" based on the famous Scottsboro trials of the early 1930's. The
court noted that the Supreme Court had not defined public controversy, but that in
this case several factors were indicative that the factual situation of the Scottsboro
case met the Gertz definition of public controversy. The trials were the focus of major
public debate, generating widespread news coverage and public attention for years.
The case also contributed to changing public attitudes about the rights of blacks to
even-handed justice. Similarly, the 1981 baseball strike affected a business entertain-
ing over forty million fans annually, not including television and newspaper audiences,
and greatly affected public attitudes and provoked broad debate on high player sala-
ries, player movement among teams and similar issues. Accordingly, the 1981 baseball
strike can properly be called a public controversy.
208. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
209. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
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case would involve a person who has achieved "pervasive fame
or notoriety 210 or one who holds a position of particular promi-
nence that unavoidably places the occupant in the limelight."
Having separated the limited-general public figure dichot-
omy into its component elements, an analysis of how to apply
the classifications and what kinds of evidence will serve this
purpose is in order.
IV
Athletes as Limited and General Public Figures
A. The Categories
An athlete may become a limited public figure as a result of
the actor's involvement, voluntarily or involuntarily, in a public
controversy in an attempt to influence its outcome.212 Such in-
volvement may occur, for example, where the actor comes into
213oreovthe public eye, nationally or locally, in an effort to resolve
some temporary crisis. One such figure, Ray Greby, the chief
negotiator for the team owners during the baseball strike of
1981, is an example of a person who came into the public eye of
the nation as one of the central characters attempting to re-
solve the seven-week stalemate.214 Although he had been, and
continues to be, a general public figure to a very select audi-
ence,215 the question suggested here is whether an actor meets
the broader limited public figure guidelines set forth in
Gertz.1 6 In the context of sports personalities, the inquiry en-
tails "looking to the nature and extent of ... [the] individual's
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
210. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
212. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
213. For a discussion of the relevant audience, see infra text accompanying notes
254-306.
214. Another recent example includes Peter Seitz, the labor arbitrator who cast the
deciding vote in 1975 that led to player free agency in baseball. See infra note 252.
Hockey's Henry Boucha and Dave Forbes, the latter the first professional athlete to be
tried criminally after an assault on Boucha during the course of a hockey game, would
also fit this test since they were highly publicized figures in the determination of
whether hockey and sports in general could police themselves. Neither player had
more than a mediocre career, certainly not enough success to have achieved the perva-
sive fame or notoriety to make them general public figures.
215. See supra note 213. The relevant audience would be sports fans among whom
he enjoys pervasive fame or notoriety.
216. 418 U.S. at 351-52.
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defamation. ' 217 The substance of the limited public figure test
is to determine whether the actor played a substantial role in
the resolution of a public issue.218 If so, he is a limited public
figure athlete; if not, he is a private person.219
The limited public figure may also achieve such status by po-
sition alone, as Waldbaum suggests. 22°  Although the
Waldbaum court did not define "position," particularly with
respect to athletic figures, it offered guidance by pointing out
that this type of limited public figure is involved in "decision-
making that affects significantly one or more public controver-
sies. '221 This category might include such persons as player
agents, umpires, referees, team owners and sportscasters. 222 It
cannot be doubted that these types of athletic figures become
embroiled in public controversies primarily, if not solely, be-
cause of their positions in the sports world. A player agent, for
example, usually remains unkown to all but a handful of the
most devoted sports fans, until, for instance, his client be-
comes involved in a well-publicized contract dispute.223 Soon
after the controversy is resolved, however, the agent once more
returns to the relative anonymity of his occupation.
A difficult issue with any public figure athlete is to determine
whether an athlete becomes a limited or general public figure
solely because of his position as a professional sports personal-
ity. After all, as Chuy pointed out, those who enter a sphere of
activity to which society devotes "massive public attention,"
thereby inviting such attention, may properly be classified as
public figures. 224 The difficulty with this proposition is that the
cases seem to hold the athlete to be a general public figure,225
217. Id. at 352.
218. Id.
219. Id. See also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298 n.32.
220. 627 F.2d at 1297. See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
221. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
222. In Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1299-1300 n.36, the court warned that "[c Iourts should
avoid generalizing, however, for labelling certain positions as always being public is
tantamount to making subject-matter classifications, forbidden under the case law."
(citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979), and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976)). What is offered here is simply a guide to assist the court and the
parties in establishing whether or not a particular plaintiff in a given instance is a pub-
lic figure, and if so, why.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
224. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
See also supra note 74.
225. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419
(9th Cir. 1969) (holding that "'[p]ublic figures' are those persons who . . . are 'in-
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without due regard for mitigating factors, such as time and au-
dience.2 2 6 As common sense experience tells us, a person's
fame builds up gradually over time, in the usual case, until he
reaches that point where most reasonable people would agree
that he is famous-a general public figure. There are, on the
other hand, the majority of instances where an athlete does not
"invite attention and comment, ' 227  because he has not
achieved "pervasive fame or notoriety. 228 Moreover, "[a] pri-
vate individual is not automatically transformed into a public
figure just by becoming involved in ... a matter that attracts
public attention . . . [and] mere newsworthiness [is insuffi-
cient] to justify application of the demanding burden of New
York Times. 229 In short, entering the domain of professional
sports is insufficient, of itself, to make one a general public
figure.
Today, there are so many professional athletes in so many
different sports whose exploits are covered daily in the media,
that it would be wholly unjustifiable to cast general public fig-
ure status upon them all, regardless of individual circum-
stances. Yet the courts have taken that stance.23 ° It would be
more appropriate and more in line with the spirit of Gertz to
focus on the audience to whom the information is dissemi-
nated 231 and the duration of time the athlete is under "public
scrutiny. '2
32
The general public figure athlete is the easier person to de-
scribe. One may become a general public figure athlete by
volved in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest.' Such
figures ... include artists, athletes, business people,. . . anyone who is famous or infa-
mous because of who he is or what he has done." (emphasis added)). Cepeda, the San
Francisco Giants' first baseman, was deemed a general public figure. See also supra
text accompanying notes 152-200.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 254-329.
227. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
228. Id. at 351.
229. Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979).
230. See supra note 225. This can be explained, however, by the simple fact that
only the most well-known athletes are publicized to the extent that a defamation or
privacy suit is filled, since they are the most "newsworthy" and the persons most likely
to be subjected to "closer public scrutiny" than the rest. See 418 U.S. at 344. A reserve
place-kicker for a perennial noncontender, for example, may play professional football
for several years, without having made any mark at all on even the local community,
much less the national community.
231. For the discussion concerning the time and audience issues, see infra text ac-
companying notes 254-329.
232. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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achieving "pervasive fame or notoriety" '233 or by holding a posi-
tion of particular prominence which unavoidably places the oc-
cupant in the limelight.234 A person achieves pervasive fame
or notoriety by engendering continuing public interest for a
sustained period of time.23 5 It is not enough that an athletic
figure achieve a great success for a very limited period,236 nor is
it sufficient that he maintain a modicum of success for a long
time.237 Although the test's boundaries are difficult to deter-
mine, certainly no one would dispute that Babe Ruth,238 for ex-
ample, was a general athletic public figure, for even today his
career is frequently discussed and is an object of comparison
in major league baseball broadcasts. 239
A person may also become a general athletic public figure
"by position alone," as suggested by Waldbaum.24° Some
figures, such as the commissioners of the major sports of foot-
ball, basketball, hockey and baseball, for example, are likely
members of this category because they occupy positions "un-
avoidably . . . [placing them in] the limelight," 241 for these
people exert tremendous influence over a sphere of activity to
which society has devoted "massive public attention. 242 This
type of general public figure athlete necessarily must occupy a
position of influence over matters of concern or interest to a
233. Id. at 351.
234. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1299 n.36 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
235. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52. See also supra text accompanying notes 224-32.
236. An example would be Al Weis, New York Mets outfielder, who rose to national
fame briefly in the 1969 World Series by his timely home runs and game-saving
catches. Shortly thereafter, he returned to his customary playing level and was soon
out of baseball. This could hardly be considered "pervasive fame or notoriety." Gertz,
418 U.S. at 351-52.
237. Many athletic figures labor in relative obscurity for several years, leaving the
sports world with no recognizable impact. For instance, Joe Cunningham played ma-
jor league baseball for over ten years without achieving what a reasonable person
would call "pervasive fame or notoriety." Id. at 351-52. He now works in similar ano-
nymity in public relations for the St. Louis Cardinals Baseball team.
238. Born George Herman Ruth in 1895, he was sports' greatest fan attraction be-
tween the two World Wars and wrought the greatest change the sport of baseball had
ever seen-the home run and the "big inning." For evidentiary factors useful in apply-
ing these tests, see supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
239. In a St. Louis Cardinals-New York Mets game on August 10, 1982, the St. Louis
Radio broadcaster Jack Buck described a long Cardinal home run as "a Ruthian poke."
240. 627 F.2d at 1287. See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
241. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1299 n.36. See also supra text accompanying notes 104-
06.
242. Chuy, 431 F. Supp. at 267. See also supra note 74.
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large portion of the well-informed citizenry, 243 and this cate-
gory need not be limited to well-known owners, referees, man-
agers and occupants of similar positions. Ironically, members
of the news media may fit neatly into this category; sportswrit-
ers such as Damon Runyan,24 Grantland Rice,245 Fred Lieb246
and Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Red Smith,247 all occu-
pied, for extended periods of time, positions placing them in
the limelight, for they shaped public opinion, or described it as
they saw fit, "invit[ing] attention and comment" 248 in the
process.
Once it is determined that a particular athletic figure is in-
deed a public figure, whether generally or for a limited range of
issues249 it must be determined what audience25 ° and what
time period 251 such status embraces. Some persons remain in
the public eye for a short time and are public figures to a very
limited audience. 252 Others may remain more or less perma-
nently etched in the collective minds of a large percentage of
243. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n.20. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-
10.
244. Damon Runyan was a popular sportswriter around the turn of the century. For
more than a decade, he wrote primarily on baseball, in Denver and San Francisco, then
went to the New York American newspaper in 1911. For the better part of another
decade, he covered boxing and other sports. See F. LIEB, BASEBALL As I HAVE KNowN
IT 243-56 (1977).
245. Grantland Rice covered baseball and other sports for the New York Mail and
other newspapers from the first years of the twentieth century until the late 1940's. He
won the 1922 award from the Baseball Writers Association of America for the best writ-
ten baseball piece of the year. Id.
246. Fred Lieb began his career as a young sportswriter for the New York Press in
1911 and continued to write regularly into the 1970's. His contribution to the game
included serving as president of the Baseball Writers Association of America from
1922-24, writing a regular column for The Sporting News in the 1930's and receiving the
J.G. Taylor Sport Award in 1972 for outstanding contribution to the game as a writer
and as an historian. Id.
247. Walter "Red" Smith, long time sports editor of the New York Times, won the
Pulitzer Prize for Distinguished Commentary in 1976 for "the literary quality of his
sports column." WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 211 (1977).
248. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
249. Id. at 351.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 254-306.
251. See supra note 145 and infra text accompanying notes 307-29.
252. For example, Peter Seitz, who in 1975 cast the deciding vote in the arbitration
case giving birth to baseball player free agency, is long forgotten by many followers of
the sport. Yet it was he who effectively overturned fifty years of Supreme Court prece-
dent, culminating in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which held baseball immune
from antitrust laws. Inasmuch as this decision gave rise to increased player movement
among teams, exorbitant salaries, player strikes and lockouts, there can be little doubt
that Seitz was a limited public figure during the winter of 1975 and the period shortly
following. But how long he retained that status is debatable, since, today, many mem-
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the population.25 3 It is to these issues that we now turn our
focus.
B. The Audience
A communication is said to be defamatory if it tends to harm
a person's reputation "so ... as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him. '254 This definition fails to answer the ques-
tion of precisely what community it is we are dealing with in
any particular defamation case. It is not necessary to define a
community or audience for the general public figure athlete,
for as the Supreme Court held in Gertz,5 a general public fig-
ure is one who "achieve[s] such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figurefor all purposes and in all con-
texts. 256 For the limited public figure athlete, however, the
difference among audiences bears on the issue of damages, for
it is axiomatic that a defamatory publication circulated nation-
ally is likely to produce greater injury to reputation than one
distributed only locally. 257 Accordingly, awards for emotional
distress and punitive damages 258 will vary with the scope of the
publication's audience.
In determining the relevant audience in a defamation case,
the factfinder must consider "colloquium," the basic averment
in a typical defamation case that the publication is "of and con-
cerning" the plaintiff.25 9 The people to whom the remarks are
bers of the public have no idea who he is or what impact he had on the game's
structure.
253. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n.20. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-
10. An excellent example of recent years is Willie Mays, an outstanding member of the
New York-San Francisco Giants and the New York Mets for 23 seasons. There are few
reasonably well-informed citizens who have not heard of Mays, and, for many, he was
the dominant symbol of baseball for much of their lives.
254. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 559.
255. 418 U.S. at 323.
256. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
257. The damages will vary, of course, for a general public figure athlete in a similar
manner. The typical case, however, concerning a general public figure athlete would
involve a national or regional publication, and present no new problems. Whether or
not the defamation relates to a per se libel category, the plaintiff will suffer greater loss
of society or be held to greater public ridicule as the audience becomes larger. See
supra notes 25-33, 107-10 and accompanying text.
258. See Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
The court granted damages of both types largely because the publication resulting
from the doctor's statements was national in scope. See supra text accompanying
notes 152-200.
259. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111.
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communicated must understand their defamatory nature as
well as precisely who they defame. An excellent case illustrat-
ing a workable test for the audience question is Geisler v. Pe-
trocelli,26° where plaintiff, a former co-employee and an
acquaintance of defendant's, sued defendant for publishing a
fictional book on the exploits of a female transsexual tennis
player, in which defendant used plaintiff's actual name. Al-
though the book, entitled Match Set, contained the usual dis-
claimer of intentional resemblance between its characters or
incidents and real persons or events, purporting to be fiction, it
may have been inspired by the emergence onto the women's
professional tennis circuit of the transsexual Renee Richards
(formerly Dr. Richard Raskin, ophthalmologist).261 Plaintiff al-
leged that despite the disclaimer, defendant's use of plaintiff's
name and physical traits and defendant's personal knowledge
of plaintiff caused reasonable people to believe that the charac-
ter in Match Set was plaintiff.262 Although the plaintiff's name-
sake is initially depicted as innocent and naive, the narrative
sets forth a sequence of events by which the protagonist is in-
duced to participate in "fixing" the outcome of a tennis match,
and "perhaps more to the author's point, lured into untoward
sexual conduct which is graphically portrayed. '263 Plaintiff,
therefore, sued defendant for libel in fostering this misimpres-
sion and for an invasion of privacy in depicting her in a false
light in the public eye.264 The trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not ad-
equately claim that the book was "of and concerning" plaintiff,
an essential element for each of plaintiff's claims.265
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded because "dismissal of this action at the pleading
stage improperly denied [plaintiff] the opportunity to adduce a
full record on the 'of and concerning' element of her claims. 266
260. 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
261. Id. at 638.
262. Id.
263. Id. To the extent that the plaintiff's conduct is portrayed as criminal, the publi-
cation would be libelous per se. Id. at 638 n.1. See also supra text accompanying notes
25-33.
264. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 638. See also supra note 138, regarding the branches of the
common law tort of invasion of privacy.
265. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 637. Regarding colloquium in general, see W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 111. See also supra text accompanying note 259.
266. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 637-38.
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The court held that in a defamation proceeding, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that:
the libel designates the plaintiff in such a way as to let those
who knew [her] understand that [she] was the person meant.
It is not necessary that all the world should understand the li-
bel; it is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff can make out
that [she] is the person meant.267
The court went on to state the appropriate test to use in resolv-
ing this issue: "it is required that the reasonable reader must
rationally suspect that the protagonist is in fact the plaintiff,
notwithstanding the author's and publisher's assurances that
the work is fictional. ' 268 Because this problem of identification
of the plaintiff is one of fact,269 plaintiff could adduce evidence
showing that she was once an athletic prodigy, that her circle
of friends resembled characters in the book, or that certain
persons believed the protagonist to be the plaintiff.270
The Geisler case points out and narrows several issues relat-
ing to the audience question. First, it addresses the question of
colloquium, that is, how closely the publication must identify
to the reader the subject of the defamation. Second, the case
suggests a standard and a means of applying it, for determin-
ing whether a particular publication sufficiently identifies the
athletic figure to support an action for libel. Third, the case
suggests a similar test to apply in false light cases of invasion
of privacy, for only if the reasonable reader suspects that the
protagonist is the plaintiff, who is depicted in an objectionable
manner,271 may an adverse 272 conclusion be drawn concerning
the plaintiff, resulting in damage to the plaintiff's reputation.
Finally, the Geisler case points out that there is a difference
267. Id. at 639 (citing Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966),
quoting Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 17, 137 N.E.2d 1, 11,
155 N.Y.S.2d 1, 15 (1956) (The quoted language actually comes from Miller v. Maxwell,
16 Wend. 9,18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836), quoting Chief Justice Abbot in Bourke v. Warren, 2
Carr. & Payn, 307)). In most cases this is not an issue since the plaintiff is mentioned
by name.
268. Qeisler, 616 F.2d at 639. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
269. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 639.
270. Id. at 640.
271. The depiction itself need not be objectionable. Rather, the manner in which
the facts are distorted, even if favorable to the plaintiff, must be objectionable to the
ordinary, reasonable person under the circumstances. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 117.
See also Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966) (famous baseball player falsely portrayed as war hero in unauthorized
biography).
272. See supra note 271.
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between a publication to a limited audience and one to a virtu-
ally unlimited audience. In the latter case, it is more difficult to
show harm since "the more virtuous the victim of the libel, the
less likely it will be that she will be able to establish this essen-
tial confusion [between herself and the protagonist] in the
mind of the third party" '273 and ironically, "the more deserving
the plaintiff of recompense for the tarnishing of a spotless rep-
utation, the less likely will be any actual recovery." '274 In a
more limited publication, it is more likely that those who know
the plaintiff will identify her as the protagonist. It is less likely,
however, that the communication will be deemed defama-
tory,275 since experience tells us that among those who know of
her, only publications of the most outrageous and derogatory
nature would cause her to be held up to ridicule, hatred or con-
tempt or to be shunned or avoided 276 by this limited commu-
nity. Therefore, a false publication, sufficiently identifying the
plaintiff to a large audience, is more likely to affect a plaintiff
adversely and result in an actionable defamation. Moreover, it
must be kept in mind that although a public figure may have
access to the media and "runs the risk of closer public scrutiny
than might otherwise be the case, '"277 it is equally true that "the
law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth
rarely catches up with a lie. 278
Another recent case addressing the audience question in the
context of the public figure doctrine arose out of a local tennis
column published by the defendant. In From v. Tallahassee
Democrat, Inc. ,279 defendant published a tennis column by a
local writer stating that plaintiff, the retiring club tennis pro-
fessional, "has an improving player's grand illusions, which
contributed to his problems as a pro" and that he "did not fully
understand his members' needs. ' 28 ° When plaintiff sued for li-
bel, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff was a public figure,
that the article was not libelous per se, and that the statements
273. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 639.
274. Id.
275. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 559. See also supra text accompanying notes 25-
26.
276. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111.
277. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
278. Id. at 344 n.9.
279. 400 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
280. Id. at 53. If false, these statements impugn plaintiff's abilities in his trade or
business and would be libelous per se. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
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were expressions of opinion, not false statements of fact.28'
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in character-
izing plaintiff as a public figure, because he was "known only
by the membership of the Winewood Country Club who partic-
ipated in the tennis program together with people who trav-
elled in those circles. 282 The appellate court went on to hold
that "[tihis could hardly meet the test in [New York Times]
... and [Gertz] . . . and their progeny. '283 The article stated
that plaintiff worked to obtain publicity for himself and for the
tennis program, organized city-wide tournaments and was fea-
tured pictorially in advertisements.284 Yet he never made any
efforts to counteract the writer's criticisms or otherwise to en-
gage the media to gain publicity or attention for his work at the
club which was the subject of the column.2815 Before the publi-
cation, therefore, plaintiff did not "thrust himself into the vor-
tex of this public issue nor did he engage the public's attention
in an attempt to influence its outcome,' 286 and "[e]ven had he
done so, he did not become involved in a 'public controversy'
as envisioned in Gertz. 287
The Geisler and From cases present a useful, logical manner
of analyzing the audience issue in the context of the public fig-
ure doctrine. First, it must be decided whether the publication
is defamatory.288 This necessarily involves examining the
likely recipients of the publication to see whether the plain-
tiff's reputation has been lowered in their estimation.289 It is at
this point that the question of whether the plaintiff is a public
figure comes into issue.29 ° This, in turn, depends on the size of
the audience, for if the plaintiff is known in only a small area,
he is unlikely to be a public figure, either general or limited.29'
Once it is decided that the plaintiff is a public figure, then we
know whether or not the New York Times standard of actual
malice applies. If it does not apply, state law governs as to the
281. From, 400 So. 2d at 54.
282. Id. The court's primary focus was on the common law privilege of opinion.
283. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
284. From, 400 So. 2d at 55.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 55 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352).
287. From, 400 So. 2d at 55 (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976)).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
289. Id.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 254-87.
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standard of care, typically a standard of ordinary negligence.292
If the New York Times standard does apply, and actual malice
is proved, then the question of damages remains.293 If "the
substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial
danger to reputation apparent,' ,,294 then the extent of the in-
jury, and hence the plaintiff's recovery, depends primarily on
how far the publication is disseminated.2 95 As in Chuy,296 dam-
ages for emotional distress may be awarded where the publica-
tion is national in scope and accompanied by the requisite
"extreme and outrageous conduct. '297 At the other extreme,
damages should be much smaller or even nominal, for the
plaintiff who proves a defamation in a local tennis column2 9 8 or
in a book of limited readership or circulation.299 In the latter
two cases, the damage to reputation cannot be nearly as great
as that caused by a defamatory publication in a national peri-
odical or newspaper; the relevant community in which the
plaintiff's reputation is harmed or in which he is held up to ridi-
cule or contempt is much smaller.3 0 Moreover, a claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress must be based on
"extreme and outrageous conduct," and a plaintiff defamed
among a small audience is less likely to sustain this burden of
proof than one defamed among a larger audience.30 '
A useful guide to the effect of the size of the audience on the
damage issue is Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. ,302 in
which the court indicated that it may look to several factors in
determining a plaintiff's public figure status.30 3 The judge may
examine statistical name recognition surveys, previous press
292. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
293. Once actual malice is proven, the plaintiff has made his prima facie case which
may go to the jury for determination of damages. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
294. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967)).
295. See supra notes 254-87 and accompanying text.
296. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979). See
supra text accompanying notes 152-200.
297. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 46.
298. From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
299. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 26 and 254-87.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 152-200. Chuy won the emotional distress
count largely because of the national scope of the publication.
302. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
303. Id. at 1295. Though used for public figure status, these factors bear heavily on
the relevant community issue, as well as on damages.
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coverage of the plaintiff, the effect of the plaintiff's actions on
others in altering their conduct or ideas, and the plaintiff's ac-
tions in shunning or seeking the attention the public has given
him.3 04 The judge should keep in mind whether the plaintiff
has assumed the risk of media attention and whether he has
access to the media for self-help. 3 5 No one factor is disposi-
tive, and a careful weighing is needed, but the consideration of
these and other relevant factors leads to a "more accurate-
and a more predictable-assessment of a person's overall fame
and notoriety in the community .,306
C. The Time Element
When a person becomes a limited public figure athlete,30 7
whether by his role in a public controversy or by his position,
the status may fade or disappear altogether with the passage of
time. In Time, Inc. v. Johnston, °8 the lower court held that a
public figure could lose such status when he is "so far removed
from his former position in the public eye, that the publisher
will no longer enjoy the prophylactic treatment accorded him
when he deals with those persons who truly are public officials
or public figures."30 9 This necessarily involves a question for
the court, inasmuch as the determination of when a limited
athlete is far enough removed from his former position in the
public eye to pierce the New York Times shield is a matter of
law, not one of fact.31 0 This change of status over time neces-
304. Id.
305. Id. These factors will be referred to collectively as the "Waldbaum factors."
306. Id. (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
307. It is axiomatic that one who is a general public figure cannot lose that status
over time inasmuch as "pervasive fame or notoriety," Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, simply will
not evaporate.
308. 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).
309. See Johnston v. Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837, 851 (M.D.N.C. 1970), rev'd, 448 F.2d
378 (4th Cir. 1971). The lower court ruled that the plaintiff was a general public figure
athlete, but this test is good for limited public figure athletes as well, because they are
only temporarily thrust into the public eye and time necessarily erodes their impres-
sion on the public consciousness. Moreover, as to an athlete who attains limited public
figure status based on his position, that status may also fade with time. See supra text
accompanying notes 89-91, 138-41 and 304-06, for a consideration of the Waldbaum
factors.
310. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). The Rosenblatt Court held that, "as
is the case with questions of privilege generally, it is for the trial Judge in the first
instance to determine whether the proofs show respondent to be a 'Public official.'"
383 U.S. at 88. See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979.), in which the court stated that "the
question has always been held to be one for the court."
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sarily affects those defamatory publications issued long after
the resolution of the controversy by which the limited public
figure athlete achieved such status. This is so because during
the controversy the limited public figure athlete is a subject of
media attention-a newsworthy person 311-and has sufficient
access to the media to counteract any harsh criticisms.312
Moreover, by exposing himself to "increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood, ' 313 a public figure cannot complain
if the New York Times shield of actual malice is applied against
him.3 4 The passage of time, however, may sufficiently erode
the controversy from public memory so as to once again make
the limited public figure athlete a private person, even with re-
spect to aspects of the controversy.31 5
In contrast to Rosenblatt316 and the lower court ruling in
Johnston,3 17 the Street v. National Broadcasting Co. 318 court re-
jected the argument that the passage of forty years from the
time of the controversy to the publication at issue caused
plaintiff to lose her public figure status. It held that "once a
person becomes a public figure in connection with a particular
controversy, that person remains a public figure thereafter for
purposes of later commentary or treatment of that contro-
versy. 319 It found support for this holding in that such figures
do not lose access to the media to counter adverse comment on
their role in the past controversy, 320 and that since "the
Supreme Court developed the public figure doctrine in order
that the press might have sufficient breathing room to compose
the first rough draft of history,. . . [i]t is no less important to
allow the historian the same leeway when he writes the second
311. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
312. Id. at 344.
313. Id. at 345.
314. Id.
315. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 170 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in the result) ("I believe that the lapse of the intervening 16 years renders consid-
eration of this petitioner's original public-figure status unnecessary," [since] "he
clearly had lost that ... [status] by the time respondents published KGB in 1974.").
316. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
317. Johnston v. Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837 (M.D.N.C. 1970), rev'd, 448 F.2d 378 (4th
Cir. 1971).
318. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095
(1981). See supra note 207.
319. 645 F.2d at 1235 (court's emphasis). Note that if a person is a general public
figure athlete, time should not affect that status because "pervasive fame," by defini-
tion, should last at least throughout one's lifetime.
320. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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or third draft." '321
Regrettably, the Street court's arguments fall short of the
mark for several reasons. First, the case involved an unusually
historic and significant controversy-the legal system's treat-
ment of blacks in the South-an issue that "remain [ s ] a living
controversy. ' 322 Rarely, if ever, does a sports controversy per-
meate the fabric of our society so deeply. Second, the passage
of time would lessen the aggrieved plaintiff's access to the
"channels of effective communication" necessary for the kind
of self-help remedy envisaged by Gertz,323 and such a plaintiff
cannot be deemed to have assumed the risk of such scrutiny.3 24
Third, as a matter of policy, historians, who have more time to
reflect and to investigate, should be held to a higher standard
than those reporting contemporaneous events. 325 Finally, the
Supreme Court in Gertz could not have intended that there be
a legitimate public interest in falsehoods after a period of time,
since the first amendment is designed to encourage debate on
public issues, not public defamations.
Similar arguments apply to the limited public figure athlete
who attains that status by position. A person may, after an ap-
propriate period of time, be "so far removed from a former po-
sition of authority that comment on the manner in which he
performed his responsibilities no longer has the interest neces-
sary to justify the New York Times rule. 326 Ultimately, balanc-
ing the competing first amendment interests in freedom of
speech and freedom of the press with the state's interest in the
individual's reputation, the test should be that
during the 'active' public figure period a wider range of articles,
including those only peripherally related to the basis of the
public figure's fame, are protected by the malice standard and
that the passage of time or intentional retreat narrows the
range of articles so protected to those directly related to the
basis for fame.327
Thus, for example, after he is no longer newsworthy according
321. Street, 645 F.2d at 1236.
322. Id. (emphasis added).
323. 418 U.S. at 344.
324. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 170-72 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
325. 645 F.2d at 1236.
326. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87, n.14 (1966). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 140.
327. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980),
reh'g denied, 638 F.2d 247, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981) (emphasis added). See also
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to the Waldbaum factors,3 2 8 Peter Seitz329 may be the subject
of comment only on a limited range of issues narrowly focused
on his decision that led to player free agency in baseball.
V
Applying the Law
Adrian Brooks, a Denver Avalanche Soccer player who chose
to sit out the Major Indoor Soccer League (MISL) playoffs over
a contract dispute, filed a libel suit against Denver Post colum-
nist Woodrow Paige, Jr. and KWGN-TV. 330 Brooks alleged that
Paige spat on his picture, "drew a moustache on it and jumped
upon it three times with malice and intent to injure the plain-
tiff's reputation,"33 ' during a televised broadcast of "Sports
Connection" on May 2, 1982. Brooks also claimed he suffered
emotional distress.3 32
The initial inquiry is whether the statements made by Paige,
assuming the truth of the allegations, are capable of defama-
tory meaning. This requires an examination of the appropriate
audience. Inasmuch as indoor soccer is not yet a "major" na-
tional sport, the relevant audience would be Denver and the
other cities in the MISL 33 The "public controversy" into
which Brooks thrust himself3 4 would be his contract dispute
with the Denver Avalanche.3 35 A reasonable person might in-
deed lower his opinion of Brooks or hold him up to contempt or
supra text accompanying notes 107-10. The Gertz case does not describe the "limited
range of issues" relevant to a "limited public figure."
328. See supra text accompanying notes 89-103 and 138-41.
329. See supra note 252.
330. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 21, 1982, at 2D, col. 1. Since no article followed the
case's progress, it is impossible, at this writing, to determine its disposition.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Note that because Brooks was plainly identified by his picture, the issue of
colloquium is not presented. See supra notes 259-70 and accompanying text. Note also
that the time element is not an issue, since the publication and the filing of suit were
only days or weeks apart, and Brooks cannot be made a public figure by publicity sur-
rounding the suit. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
334. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52. The plaintiff clearly has not attained '"pervasive fame
or notoriety" sufficient to be labeled a general public figure. See id. at 351-52. More-
over, since indoor soccer is a fledgling sport, it is doubtful whether Brooks could be
considered a limited public figure athlete by virtue of his position on the Avalanche.
See also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
335. This "public controversy" is much the same as that which formed one of the
possible bases for plaintiff Chuy's public figure status in Chuy. See supra text accom-
panying notes 163-69.
[Vol. 6
TORTS IN SPORTS
ridicule336 because of Paige's actions. After all, our society de-
votes "massive public attention" '337 to sports and depends on
those who write or comment on it to help form its opinions.
Therefore, Paige's actions are "capable of defamatory
meaning. 338
The likely result of this case, under this article's analysis,
would be to categorize plaintiff as a limited public figure ath-
lete for purposes of his contract holdout in Denver, surround-
ing areas and other MISL cities. Depending on the area
involved in the contract controversy, however, Brooks may not
be a limited public figure.3 39 Since the contract dispute must
involve consequences beyond a mere private concern and af-
fect non-participants in a meaningful way,34 ° it is highly un-
likely that Brooks should be classified as a limited public
figure, even to the Denver fans. Therefore, he would stand a
very good chance of recovery, since states may apply a mere
negligence standard for private plaintiffs.34 '
VI
Conclusion
From the New York Times rule regarding "public officials '342
to its expansion to "public figures" in Butts343 and Walker,344
and the delineation of "public figure" status in Gertz,345 the
Supreme Court has attempted to balance the countervailing
policies of protecting freedom of speech and of the press and
personal interest in reputation.
Although few recent defamation cases have distinguished
the general from the limited public figure, or have directly in-
volved audience 34 or time347 factors in their analyses, at least
one case has drawn scholarly attention to these issues. 348
336. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
337. See supra note 74.
338. See supra notes 186-87.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
340. Id.
341. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-52.
342. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
343. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
344. Id.
345. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 254-306.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 307-29.
348. See, e.g., Comment, Public Figures and the Passage of Time: Scottsboro Revis-
ited in Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 34 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1982).
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While the courts have not yet been willing to adopt a flexible
approach to these factors and apply them on a case-by-case
method, this article presents an orderly way of doing so. Going
beyond the neat conclusion espoused by the courts that "once
a public figure, always a public figure," regardless of the audi-
ence of the publication, this article proposes that the size of the
audience bears directly on the question of the plaintiff's public
figure status, as well as on damages. Further, it suggests that
the rigid failure of the courts to conclude that a plaintiff's pub-
lic figure status has passed with time349 be tempered by a more
flexible test using the Waldbaum factors.3 5 0 This approach will
give sportswriters the "breathing space" necessary under the
first amendment,35' while preserving the dignity of the ath-
lete's relational interest in his good name and reputation 35 2
which lies, after all, at the heart of the law of defamation.3
349. Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454
U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 89-103.
351. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
352. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
353. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111.
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